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Abstract
One-way hash chains have been used in many micropayment schemes due to their
simplicity and efficiency. In this paper we introduce the notion of multi-dimensional
hash chains, which is a new generalization of traditional one-way hash chains. We
show that this construction has storage-computational complexity of O(log
2
N) per
chain element, which is comparable with the best result reported in recent literature.
Based on multi-dimensional hash chains, we then propose two cash-like micropayment
schemes, which have a number of advantages in terms of efficiency and security. We
also point out some possible improvements to PayWord and similar schemes by using
multi-dimensional hash chains.
1 Introduction
One-way hash chains are an important cryptographic primitive and have been used as a
building block of a variety of cryptographic applications such as access control, one-time
signature, electronic payment, on-line auction, etc.
In particular, there are many micropayment schemes based on one-way hash chains,
including PayWord [8], NetCard [1], micro-iKP [5] and others.
By definition, micropayments are electronic payments of low value. Other schemes
designed for payments of high value normally use a digital signature to authenticate every
payment made. Such an approach is not suitable for micropayments because of high
computational cost and bank processing cost in comparison with the value of payment.
The use of hash chains in micropayment schemes allows minimizing the use of digi-
tal signature, whose computation is far slower than the computation of a hash function
(according to [8], hash functions are about 100 times faster than RSA signature verifica-
tion, and about 10,000 times faster than RSA signature generation). Moreover, because
a whole hash chain is authenticated by a single digital signature on the root of chain,
successive micropayments can be aggregated into a single larger payment, thus reducing
bank processing cost.
There are a variety of improvements to hash chains. For example, in the PayTree
payment scheme [7], Jutla and Yung generalized the hash chain to a hash tree. This
construction allows the customer to use parts of a tree to pay different vendors. Recently,
researchers have proposed a number of improved hash chains, which are more efficient in
terms of computational overhead and storage requirement [3, 6, 11, 4].
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This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the notion of multi-
dimensional hash chains (MDHC for short). We also analyze efficiency of this construction
and show that RSA modular exponentiations could be used as one-way hash functions of a
MDHC. Section 3 describes two cash-like micropayment schemes based on MDHC, which
have a number of advantages in terms of efficiency and security. In section 4 we also
examine some possible improvements to PayWord and similar schemes. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Multi-Dimensional Hash Chain
2.1 Motivation
The notion of MDHC originates from one-way hash chains and one-way accumulators [2].
Here we briefly describe these two constructions.
A hash chain is generated by applying a hash function multiple times. Suppose that we
have a one-way hash function y = h(x) and some starting value xn. A hash chain consists
of values x0, x1, x2, ..., xn where xi = h(xi+1) for i = 0, 1, ..., n− 1. The value x0 = h
n(xn)
is called the root of hash chain. The figure below depicts a hash chain of size n:
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Figure 1: A one-way hash chain
In contrast, a one-way accumulator is the output of multiple hash functions, each of
them applied only once:
y = h1(h2(...(hm(x))))
In order to ensure that the output is uniquely determined regardless of the application
order, functions h1, h2, ..., hm must be in pairs commutative, i.e. hi(hj(x)) = hj(hi(x)) for
any x.
Combining the two constructions described above, we define a multi-dimensional hash
chain as the result of multiple applications of different commutative hash functions, so the
root of an m-dimensional hash chain is:
X0 = h
n1
1 (h
n2
2 (...(h
nm
m (XN ))))
It is necessary to note that MDHC differs from other generalizations of normal hash
chain such as hash tree, which is used in PayTree scheme. In particular such trees are
generated from multiple leaf nodes, while a MDHC is generated from a single starting
value (i.e. the value XN above).
2.2 Definitions
We begin with necessary definitions.
Definition 1. Two functions h1, h2 : X → X are called commutative if h1(h2(x)) =
h2(h1(x)) for any x ∈ X.
Definition 2. A one-way function h : X → Y is called one-way independent of one-
way functions h1, h2, ..., hm of the same domain if for any x ∈ X, computing h
−1(x) is
intractable even if values h−11 (x), h
−1
2 (x), ..., h
−1
m (x) are known.
And now we define MDHC as follows.
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Definition 3. Let h1, h2, ..., hm be m one-way hash functions that are in pairs commu-
tative and every of them is one-way independent from all others. An m-dimensional hash
chain of size (n1, n2, ..., nm) consists of values xk1,k2,...,km where:
xk1,k2,...,ki,...,km = hi(xk1,k2,...,ki+1,...,km) for i = 1, 2, ...,m and ki = 0, 1, ..., ni
The value XN = xn1,n2,...,nm is called the starting node, and the value X0 = x0,0,...0 is
called the root of the MDHC, which is uniquely determined fromXN due to commutativity
of hash functions:
X0 = h
n1
1 (h
n2
2 (...(h
nm
m (XN )))) =
m∏
i=1
hnii (XN )
As an illustration, the figure below depicts a two-dimensional hash chain of size (3,2):
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Figure 2: A two-dimensional hash chain
2.3 Efficiency analysis
In recent literature, there are a number of improvements to one-way hash chains that
aim to be more efficient in terms of computational overhead and storage requirement. A
widely used metric for one-way hash chain efficiency is the storage-computational com-
plexity, which is the product of the traversal overhead and the storage required to compute
consecutive nodes of the hash chain.
It is easy to see that a linear hash chain size of n has storage-computational complexity
of O(n). In fact, if we precompute and store all nodes (storage of O(n)), then no com-
putation is needed when a node is requested (traversal of O(1)). Alternatively, we can
store only the starting value, and compute every node from the beginning each time it is
requested. This approach requires storage of O(1) and O(n) computations. Also, if we
store each of t nodes, then storage of O(n/t) and O(t) computations are required. So, in
any case, the storage-computational complexity of the linear hash chain is O(n).
In [3, 6, 11] the authors have proposed new techniques that make traversal and storage
more efficient, which require O(log2 n) computations and O(log2 n) storage, resulting in
storage-computational complexity of O(log 22 n). Recently, Hu et al. [4] have presented a
new hierarchical construction for one-way hash chains that requires O(log2 n) storage and
only O(1) traversal overhead.
In our case of m-dimensional hash chain of size n (for simplicity we assume all dimen-
sions have the same size n1 = n2 = ... = nm = n), the number of nodes is N = (n+ 1)
m.
If we store only the starting node of the chain (storage of O(1)) then maximal number
of calculations required to compute any node is nm = n logn+1N , or log2N if we select
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n = 1. In that case the storage-computational complexity of MDHC is O(log2 N), which
is equivalent to the results in [4].
The advantage of MDHC is its simple implementation that does not rely on the so-
called pebbling technique, which is used in the constructions mentioned above. However,
the main limitation of this construction is the fact that hash functions have to meet the
conditions described in the definition of MDHC. The RSA modular exponentiation is
known to meet these conditions, but it is not as fast as the traditional hash functions, e.g.
MD5 or SHA.
2.4 RSA modular exponentiation
Let consider the function of RSA modular exponentiation:
y = xc mod M
where c is some constant value and M is an RSA modulus, which is a product of two large
primes of equal bit length p and q.
According to [2], the RSA modular exponentiation functions with appropriately se-
lected exponents could meet MDHC requirements.
First, obviously these functions are in pairs commutative: hi(hj(x)) = x
ci cj mod M =
hj(hi(x))
Second, one-wayness of these functions is derived from the RSA assumption [9], which
states that the problem of finding the modular root x = y1/c mod M is intractable.
Finally, regarding one-way independence of functions, Shamir [12] showed that if c is
not a divisor of the product c1 c2 ... cm then the modular roots y
1/c1 mod M, y1/c2 mod
M, ..., y1/cm mod M are insufficient to compute the value of y1/c mod M .
Therefore we can use the functions of RSA modular exponentiation as one-way hash
functions to construct multi-dimensional hash chains.
In that case we have following recursive expression:
xk1,k2,...,ki,...,km = (xk1,k2,...,ki+1,...,km)
ci mod M for i = 1, 2, ...,m and ki = 0, 1, ..., ni
where c1, c2, ..., cm are exponents of RSA functions h1, h2, ..., hm respectively.
Note that if one knows the factorization of M (i.e. knows p and q), then one can
compute X0 quickly by using following expression:
X0 = XN
m∏
i=1
c
ni
i
mod E
mod M
where E = ϕ(M) = (p− 1)(q − 1), and ϕ denotes the Euler’s totient function.
The expression above consists of only one modular exponentiation with modulus M
and log2 N modular multiplications with modulus E. Since a multiplication is far faster
than an exponentiation, this expression allows us to compute X0 from XN in a very
effective manner.
3 Cash-like Schemes Based on MDHC
Cash-like payment schemes use the notion of electronic coin, which is an authenticated
(by the bank) bit string that is easy to verify, but hard to forge. Examples of such coin
are hash collisions (as in MicroMint [8]), or digital signatures (as in Ecash [10]).
Let’s recall the definition of MDHC. If we select the size of the hash chain with n = 1
then all nodes Xi = x0,0,...,1,...0 (with all kj 6=i = 0, except ki = 1) have the same hash
value: hi(Xi) = X0. So we can use a pair (Xi, hi) as an electronic coin since:
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– It is easy to verify by just one hashing.
– It is hard to forge because hash functions hi are one-way, and their one-way inde-
pendence assures that coin forgery is impossible even if one knows other coins with
the same root X0.
As a proof of that concept, we suggest two micropayment schemes based on MDHC
with the RSA modular exponentiation. We refer to these as S1 and S2 schemes.
3.1 The S1 scheme
We assume that there are three parties involved in a micropayment scheme, namely a
bank (B), a customer (C) and a vendor (V). B is trusted by both C and V.
Setup:
– B selects an RSA modulus M = pq where p and q are large safe primes of equal bit
length. A prime p is called safe if p = 2p′ + 1 where p′ is also an odd prime.
– B chooses m constant values c1, c2, ..., cm that satisfy the condition of one-way inde-
pendence, i.e. each ci is not a factor of
∏
j 6=i cj . These values together with modulus
M are public parameters and can be used for multiple coin generations.
– To generate m coins, B picks a random value XN and computes:
C = c1c2...cm mod E where E = (p− 1)(q − 1)
X0 = h1(h2(...(hm(XN )))) = X
C
N mod M
Xi = h1(h2(...(hi−1(hi+1(...(hm(XN ))))))) = X
C c−1
i
mod E
N mod M , i = 1, ...,m
Now B has m coins (Xi, ci).
– B keeps X0 in a public list of coin roots.
– For prevention of double-spending B keeps another list of all unspent coins. In
addition, B can also generate vendor-specific as well as customer-specific coins by
using some bit portions of constants ci to form vendor ID and customer ID, similar
to the technique used in MicroMint scheme.
– C buys a sufficiently large number of coins from B before making purchases.
Payment:
– C pays a coin (Xi, ci) to vendor V.
– V verifies the coin by computing X0 = X
ci
i mod M , and checks if X0 is in the list of
coin roots. Note that this list is relative small and does not change frequently so C
could keep it locally.
– To assure that a coin was not double-spent, V either checks the list of unspent coins
on-line with B, or checks (off-line) the list of coins he already received if the coin is
vendor-specific.
Redemption:
– V deposits the coins he got from customers to B and receives an amount correspond-
ing to number of coins.
At the end of the coin validity period, C can sell unused coins back to B or exchange
them for new coins.
The proposed above scheme has several advantages:
– Coins are hard to forge under the RSA assumption.
– Payment can be made off-line by using vendor-specific coins.
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– If customer-specific coins are not used, the scheme is anonymous and untraceable
because coins contain no customer information and there are no links between coins.
However, the disadvantages of this scheme are:
– Generation and verification of coins is not very efficient. Each coin requires one
modular exponentiation to generate or verify it, which is much slower than normal
hash calculation.
– The list of unspent coins can be very big, though this is a common problem of most
coin-based schemes.
To overcome these disadvantages, we propose a modified scheme with larger size hash
chains (i.e. with n > 1). In this scheme, B generates m chains of coins at once, rather
than m single coins. Each coin chain is similar to the hash chain used in the PayWord
scheme.
3.2 The S2 scheme
Setup:
– B selects public parameters M and c1, c2, ..., cm in the same way as in the S1 scheme.
Let n be the size of the hash chains (for simplicity we assume all dimensions have
the same size i.e. n1 = n2 = ... = nm = n).
– B picks a random value XN and computes:
C = cn1 c
n
2 ...c
n
m mod E where E = (p− 1)(q − 1)
X0 = X
C
N mod M
Xi = X
C c−n
i
mod E
N mod M for i = 1, 2, ...,m
Now B has m coin chains (Xi, ci). Each of those chains contains exactly n coins
(xi,j , ci, j) for j = 1, 2, ..., n where:
xi,j = x
ci
i,j+1 mod M for i = 1, 2, ...,m and j = 0, 1, ..., n − 1
xi,n = Xi and xi,0 = X0
The coins from one coin chain must be paid to the same vendor.
– For double-spending prevention, now there is no need to keep track of all unspent
coins. Instead, B keeps the list of first coins of all unused chains.
– As in the S1 scheme, coin chains can be vendor-specific as well as customer-specific.
– C buys coin chains from B before making purchases.
Payment:
– C pays a vendor V the coins from a coin chain. The first coin of the chain (xi,1, ci, 1)
is verified by computing X0 = xi,0 = x
ci
i,1 mod M and lookup of X0 in the list of
chain roots. It is also checked for double-spending by lookup in the list of unused
chains. Any subsequent coin is verified by checking that it hashes to the previous
coin in the chain, as in the PayWord scheme:
hi(xi,j+1) = x
ci
i,j+1 mod M ≡ xi,j
Redemption:
– V deposits the last coin (i.e. the coin with highest index j) of each coin chain he got
from customers to B and receives an amount corresponding to number of coins.
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Comparing with the S1 scheme, this modified scheme retains all advantages of S1, but
storage requirement is reduced by factor of n. In fact, B keeps track of only the first coins
of n-coin chains.
Another advantage of this scheme is more efficient coin generation. Because B knows
the factorization of M, he can compute the starting node of a coin chain by just one modular
exponentiation. Thus the cost of this computational expensive operation is shared over
all coins of the chain. Similarly, B can also verify coin chains that he got from vendors by
computing one modular exponentiation per chain.
Generally speaking, the S2 scheme combines the advantages of two approaches. A
first approach uses unrelated coins that are convenient for payments to multiple vendors.
Another approach uses chains of coins that are easy to generate and verify. In our scheme
different coin chains are unrelated, while coins within a chain are generated and verified
only by repeated hashing.
4 Improve PayWord Scheme by Using MDHC
The PayWord scheme has been proposed in [8]. It is based on one-way hash chains
described in the section 2. In this scheme, before making purchases a customer C generates
a hash chain x0, x1, ...xn (that is a chain of paywords) and sends his signature of the root
x0 to the vendor V. The customer then makes a payment to V by revealing the next
payword, which can be verified by checking that it hashes to the previous payword.
The PayWord scheme allows a vendor to aggregate successive payments from a cus-
tomer by sending only last payword he got from the customer to the bank for redemption.
However, a vendor cannot aggregate payments of different customers, nor can a customer
use the same chain of paywords to make payments to different vendors, because there is
no way to merge different hash chains.
By using MDHC, we can improve PayWord scheme in a number of ways. Below we
briefly describe two of such possible improvements. Note that some irrelevant details in
these descriptions are omitted for convenience.
4.1 Multiple denominations
In the original PayWord scheme the size of the hash chain must be large enough. For
example, if each micropayment is worth 1 cent and total payment is up to $100, then a
chain with size of 10,000 must be generated, which requires 10,000 hash calculations.
We can reduce the number of hash calculations by using MDHC instead of linear hash
chain. The idea is that every dimension of MDHC will be associated with different weight
(or denomination) according to some number system (e.g. decimal or binary).
Suppose we have an m-dimensional hash chain with size of n. If one step in the
(i+1)th dimension is equivalent to (n + 1) steps in ith dimension, then a node xk1,k2,...,km
corresponds to the value:
k1 + k2(n+ 1) + k3(n+ 1)
2 + ...+ km(n+ 1)
m−1
The maximal value that could be represented by this hash chain is N = (n+ 1)m − 1
and the number of hash calculations required to generate the hash chain is n logn+1(N+1).
In the case of a binary number system (i.e. n = 1) it is log2(N + 1).
Returning to the example above, the hash chain now requires just 14 calculations to
generate.
Similarly, verification of the payword also requires significantly less calculations than
in the case of the original PayWord scheme.
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4.2 Multiple vendors
In the PayWord scheme a hash chain can be used for payments to only one vendor. A
customer must generate different hash chains for payment to different vendors.
We can overcome this drawback by using MDHC as well. Let every vendor Vi in the
payment system is assigned a different hash function hi (i.e. a public parameter ci in the
case of RSA modular exponentiation).
Now, in order to make payment to m different vendors, a customer generates an m-
dimensional hash chain with their public parameters ci and signs its root. The customer
then makes a payment to Vi by revealing the next payword in the i
th dimension, starting
from the root of hash chain.
In particular, if the current payword is xk1,k2,...,ki,...,km, the next payword in i
th dimen-
sion will be xk1,k2,...,ki+1,...,km.
At the end of the day, vendors deposit the last paywords they got to the bank for
redemption. The bank picks the last payword (which is the one with highest indices)
among paywords with certain root (which all come from one customer). Finally, the bank
credits vendors Vi by the amount equivalent to ki, and debits the customer’s account
accordingly.
There could be other possible improvements to the PayWord scheme by using MDHC.
For example we can aggregate payments of different customers into a single MDHC that
is generated by the bank, or we can construct a payment scheme with multiple currencies,
etc.
5 Conclusion
The proposed multi-dimensional hash chain is a simple and efficient construction for one-
way hash chains. Whereas a traditional one-way hash chain has a storage-computational
complexity of O(n), our construction achieves a complexity of O(log2 n), which is compa-
rable with the best result among other recently proposed constructions.
We show that multi-dimensional hash chains can be very useful in micropayment
schemes. In particular, we suggest two cash-like micropayment schemes based on MDHC
with RSA modular exponentiation as one-way hash function. The first scheme utilizes
coins that are hard to forge under the RSA assumption. This scheme could be also off-line
and untraceable. The second scheme has additional advantages including very efficient
coin generation/verification and much less storage requirements.
We also point out some possible improvements to PayWord and similar schemes by
using MDHC, including payword chains with multiple denominations, and a scheme that
allows payment to multiple vendors using the same payword chain.
An open issue for our construction is whether another one-way hash function can be
found that meets MDHC requirements, and at the same time is more efficient than RSA
modular exponentiation.
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